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I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court's decision in Stanley v. Illinois 1 opened the
door for the search by putative fathers2 for constitutional recognition.
In response to Stanley, many states amended their statutes to afford
the unwed father a limited right to participate in his child's adoption
proceeding.3 This new found recognition, however, has caused several
distinct problems which are directly attributable to the nature of the
nonmarital familial relationship. The problems include notification of
1. 405 U.S. 645 (1972). In Stanley, the Court held that the unwed father was entitled
to a hearing on his fitness as a parent. In addition, the Court noted that the State
of Illinois, by denying Stanley a hearing, while extending it to all other parents
whose custody of their children is challenged, deprived him of rights guaranteed
by the equal protection clause. Id. at 649.
2. A putative father is defined as "[t]he alleged or reputed father of an illegitimate
child." BLACK'S LAw DICIONARY 1113 (5th ed. 1979).
3. See generally Note, The Putative Father's Parental Rights: A Focus on Family, 58
NEB. L. REV. 610 (1979).
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the unwed father, refusal of the father to sign the adoption consent
form, and injury to the mother, adoptive parents, or child in regard to
the publication of notice.
In an effort to eliminate the above problems and expedite the adop-
tion process of children born out of wedlock, Nebraska adopted a stat-
utory scheme requiring putative fathers to take positive steps to assert
their parental rights.4 Section 43-104.02 of the Nebraska statutes was
enacted by the legislature to perform a function similar to a statute of
limitations.5 Pursuant to this statute, a putative father in Nebraska
must file a notice of intent to claim paternity with the Department of
Social Services within five days after the birth of the child.6 If the
father fails to file the requisite claim, the unwed mother's consent
shall be deemed sufficient for the purpose of the adoption, and the
4. The provisions under scrutiny in this Note are NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-104.02 to -
104.04 (1984). NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-104.02 (1984) provides:
Adoption; child born out of wedlock; relinquishment or consent re-
quirements; paternity claim; notice; contents. (1) Relinquishment or
consent for the purpose of adoption given only by a mother of a child
born out of wedlock pursuant to section 43-104 shall be sufficient to place
the child for adoption and the rights of any alleged father shall not be
recognized thereafter in any court unless the person claiming to be the
father of the child has filed with the Department of Social Services on
forms provided by the department, within five days after the birth of
such child, a notice of intent to claim paternity.
(2) The notice shall contain the claimant's name and address, the
name and last-known address of the mother, and the month and year of
the birth or the expected birth of the child.
NEB. REv. STAT. § 43-104.03 (1984) provides:
Paternity claim; notice; to whom given; effect. Within three days af-
ter the filing of a notice to claim paternity, the Director of Social Serv-
ices shall cause a certified copy of such notice to be mailed by certified
mail to (1) the mother or prospective mother of such child at the last-
known address shown on the notice of intent to claim paternity, or (2) an
agent specifically designated in writing by the mother or prospective
mother to receive such notice. The notice shall be admissible in any ac-
tion for paternity under sections 43-1401 to 43-1413, and shall estop the
claimant from denying his paternity of such child thereafter and shall
contain language that he acknowledges liability for contribution to the
support and education of the child after its birth and for contribution to
the pregnancy-related medial expenses of the mother.
NEB. REv. STAT. § 43-104.04 (1984) provides:
Paternity claim; failure to file notice; effect. If a notice of paternity is
not filed within five days, the mother of a child born out of wedlock or
an agent specifically designated in writing by the mother may request,
and the Department of Social Services shall supply, a certificate that no
notice of intent to claim paternity has been filed with the department
and the filing of such certificate pursuant to section 43-102 shall elimi-
nate the need or necessity of a consent or relinquishment for adoption by
the natural father of such child.
5. Hearing on L.B. 224 Before Nebraska Judiciary Comm., 84th Leg., 1st Sess. 6
(Jan. 29, 1976)(statement of Eleanor Swanson) [hereinafter Hearing].
6. NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-104.02 (1984).
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unwed father's paternal rights are terminated.7
The Nebraska Supreme Court analyzed the constitutionality of sec-
tion 43-104.02 in two recent decisions.8 First, in Shoecraft v. Catholic
Social Services Bureau, Inc. ,9 an unwed father filed his notice of pater-
nity four days late. The father argued that section 43-104.02 violated
both the United States and Nebraska constitutional guarantees of due
process and equal protection. The Nebraska Supreme Court found the
five-day provision in section 43-104.02 constitutional. Pursuant to sec-
tion 43-104.02, the father lost all rights to his child.
In a subsequent decision, In re Application of S.R.S. & M.B.S.,1o the
Nebraska Supreme Court again was confronted with the question of
the constitutionality of section 43-104.02. In S.R.S. & M.B.S., the puta-
tive father did not file a notice of paternity until thirty months after
the birth of his child. The court acknowledged this failure, but
stressed the fact that the father had lived with the child and contrib-
uted to its support for nineteen of the child's first twenty-four months.
Distinguishing the facts from those in Shoecraft, the court held that
section 43-104.02 was unconstitutional as applied to custodial fathers.
The court did reaffirm its holding in Shoecraft by stating that section
43-104.02 does have possible constitutional applications. 11 In the wake
of these two decisions, the constitutionality of section 43-104.02 is
questionable.
This Note will analyze the five-day Nebraska adoption statutes12
and argue that the statutes are unconstitutional. More specifically,
Part II of this Note will provide an overview of the two Nebraska
Supreme Court decisions. Following this discussion, Part III provides
a due process and equal protection analysis of the five-day statutes in
light of these two decisions and the four relevant United States
Supreme Court decisions.' 3 Part IV will look at the underlying legis-
lative history of the statutes and offer a hypothesis for the existing
confusion surrounding the statutes. Finally, Part V will present a pro-
posal for statutory reform. The statutory proposal will include new
statutory provisions and the relevant research and reasoning support-
ing such provisions.
7. Id.
8. Shoecraft v. Catholic Social Servs. Bureau, Inc., 222 Neb. 574, 385 N.W.2d 448
(1986); In re Application of S.R.S. & M.B.S., 225 Neb. 759, 408 N.W.2d 272 (1987).
9. 222 Neb. 574, 385 N.W.2d 448 (1986).
10. 225 Neb. 759, 408 N.W.2d 272 (1987).
11. Id. at 769, 408 N.W.2d at 279.
12. NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-104.02 to -104.04 (1984).
13. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978);




A. Shoecraft v. Catholic Social Services Bureau, Inc.
1. Facts
In Shoecraft, the unwed mother and father were students at the
University of Nebraska at the time the mother became pregnant. The
mother's pregnancy and a later confirmation of the pregnancy were
both communicated to the father, Shoecraft. The parties remained in
contact during the pregnancy and several times discussed a possible
relinquishment for adoption. During the pregnancy term, Shoecraft
did not pay any of the mother's expenses, nor did he make an effort to
complete and return the relevant medical questionnaires. The puta-
tive father received prompt notice of the birth of his son and visited
the mother two days after the birth. Shoecraft filed a notice acknowl-
edging paternity nine days after the birth of the child.14 The mother
subsequently relinquished the child to the Catholic Social Services Bu-
reau, which placed the child with prospective adoptive parents.
Shoecraft applied for a writ of habeas corpus alleging paternity,
acknowledgment, and subsequent relinquishment by the mother. The
district court held that sections 43-104.02 to 43-104.04 of the Nebraska
statutes were void and violated the United States and Nebraska consti-
tutional guarantees of due process and equal protection.15
2. Majority Opinion
Prior to initiating its evaluation of the Nebraska statutory scheme,
the Nebraska Supreme Court contemplated the nature of the asserted
right and the interests at stake in an adoption proceeding. Although
the court recognized that the status of an unwed father is clearly dis-
tinguishable from that of a separated or divorced father, an unwed
father's suspect classification and the state's compelling interest in the
well-being of the child required the application of a strict scrutiny
test.16
Upon making this determination, the majority quickly dispensed
with the due process claim advanced by Shoecraft. The majority ex-
pressed concern about the absence of a provision providing for notifi-
cation to the father concerning the birth of his child. In a particular
case, such an omission could render the termination of an unwed fa-
ther's rights constitutionally suspect as violative of due process.17 In
14. Shoecraft v. Catholic Social Servs. Bureau, Inc., 222 Neb. 574, 575, 385 N.W.2d 448,
450 (1986). NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-104.02 (1984) requires a father to file a notice of
paternity within five days after the birth.
15. Shoecraft v. Catholic Social Servs. Bureau, Inc., 222 Neb. 574, 575, 385 N.W.2d 448,
450 (1986).
16. Id. at 577, 385 N.W.2d at 451.
17. Id. at 578, 385 N.W.2d at 451.
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the present case, however, the court noted that Shoecraft knew about
the pregnancy, the whereabouts of the mother, and the date of the
birth. Thus, the court held that the lack of a notice provision in the
adoptive statutes did not render the scheme unconstitutional as ap-
plied to Shoecraft.
The majority proceeded to address the alleged equal protection de-
ficiency of the adoption statutes. Upon reviewing the relevant stat-
utes, the court found an inherent difference in the treatment of the
mother and the father. Pursuant to section 43-104.02, an unwed
mother in the State of Nebraska is entitled to automatic custody of the
child. Termination of her custody must be preceded by notice, a hear-
ing, and a subsequent finding of unfitness. Further, the removal must
be in the best interests of the child.18 An unwed father, on the other
hand, has no automatic right to custody, must acknowledge the pater-
nity within five days of the birth, and must establish paternity in a
judicial proceeding.19
The majority offered several positive state interests to justify its
decision that the statute, as applied to Shoecraft, was constitutional.
First, the five-day standard coincides with the approximate amount of
time a mother and a child are kept in a hospital after birth.20 The five-
day period allows the mother a reasonable amount of time to deter-
mine whether the father will come forward to claim the child. If the
father fails to claim the child during this period, the mother can indi-
vidually relinquish the child prior to becoming exceedingly attached
to the child.
Second, the majority recognized the desirability of placing a child
born out of wedlock as soon as possible after birth.21 A prompt place-
ment policy provides the child a home with parents anxious to rear
and support the child, rather than a home in which the mother must
depend on social agency support or on the outcome of a judicial pro-
ceeding to compel child support.
Finally, the majority acknowledged the state's view that a rapid
determination of an unwed father's right to object to a relinquishment
and subsequent adoption is in the best interests of the child, the relin-
quishing mother, and the prospective parents.22 Such a policy acts to
remove the doubt surrounding an illegitimate child's adoption pro-
ceeding and, further, diminishes the fears of the potential adoptive
parents.
After an extensive evaluation of the statute's purposes and legisla-
tive history, the court considered the claims of the putative father.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 578, 385 N.W.2d at 452.





First, the court noted that Shoecraft had exhibited no responsibility
for the child or the mother prior to the birth. Based on Shoecraft's
lack of concern and support, the court, relying on the reasoning ex-
pressed by the Supreme Court in Quilloin v. Walcott,23 stated that
Shoecraft's rights were clearly distinguishable from those of a di-
vorced or separated father and, accordingly, Nebraska could constitu-
tionally afford him less veto authority.24 In a similar fashion, the
court discredited Shoecraft's claim of ignorance of the law. In simple
terms, the court stated that ignorance of the law was no excuse.25 Sec-
tion 43-104.02 was, therefore, deemed constitutional as applied to the
facts of the case.
3. Dissent
Chief Justice Krivosha dissented from the majority opinion. In his
view, section 43-104.02 violated both the fourteenth amendment to the
United States Constitution and article I, section 3 of the Nebraska
Constitution.26
Chief Justice Krivosha stated that a common thread ran through-
out several similar United States Supreme Court cases which under-
mined the validity of section 43-104.02. Although the majority argued
that the purpose of the act was to facilitate the adoption of children
born out of wedlock, Chief Justice Krivosha noted that to accomplish
this purpose, section 43-104.02 treated putative fathers differently
than unwed mothers. In Krivosha's opinion, such a difference in
treatment has been held objectionable by the Supreme Court in its
adoption decisions.2 7
In essence, Chief Justice Krivosha's objection to section 43-104.02
was that it unconstitutionally discriminated against putative fathers,
and, thereby, denied unwed fathers in Nebraska equal protection. To
support his view, Chief Justice Krivosha repeatedly quoted Caban v.
Mohammed 28 and Stanley v. Illinois,29 which both held adoption stat-
23. 434 U.S. 246 (1978). In Quilloin, an unwed father attempted to block the adoption
of his son and sought visitation rights. The issue confronting the Court was
whether the state adoption laws that denied the unwed father the authority to
prevent the adoption of his illegitimate child were constitutional. The Court re-
jected the father's assertions that his interests were indistinguishable from those
of a married or separated father and, as a result, held that the statute did not
deny him his rights under the due process and equal protection clauses. In find-
ing the father's rights distinguishable, the Court noted that the father had never
shouldered any responsibility with respect to the daily supervision, education,
protection or care of the child. Id.
24. Shoecraft v. Catholic Social Servs. Bureau, Inc., 222 Neb. 574, 580, 385 N.W.2d 448,
452 (1986).
25. Id.
26. Id. at 580, 385 N.W.2d at 453 (Krivosha, C.J., dissenting).
27. Id.
28. 441 U.S. 380 (1979). In Caban, the unwed mother and father both filed petitions
198
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utes violative of the equal protection clause.
Several inherent characteristics of the Nebraska statute provided
Chief Justice Krivosha with further support for his conclusion. First,
although section 43-104.02 does not automatically deny the putative
father the right to notice and a hearing, it does seek to accomplish a
similar end.30 The narrow manner of filing prescribed in section 43-
104.02 requires an unwed father to file a completed form with the De-
partment of Social Services within five days after the birth.
Second, Krivosha expressed his concern over the apparent rigidity
of the relatively short period of time provided to a putative father to
file. Pursuant to section 43-104.02, a putative father, such as Shoecraft,
could forever lose his rights to his child because he filed four days
beyond the five-day prerequisite.3 1
Next, Chief Justice Krivosha lamented the inconsistencies which
are inherent within the Nebraska adoption laws.32 Two statutes in
particular, sections 13-109 and 13-102 are inconsistent with section 43-
104.02. Section 13-109 allows a putative father to establish paternity
by providing support,33 while section 13-102 allows judicial acknowl-
edgement of paternity.34 Neither of the aforementioned statutes,
however, require a putative father to file a form within five days. Fur-
ther, section 13-111 allows the mother four years to establish pater-
nity, yet a father is afforded merely five days.35
for the adoption of their children. The surrogate granted the mother's petition to
adopt the children thereby cutting off all of the unwed father's rights and obliga-
tions. The issue before the Court was whether the distinctions in the state stat-
utes, requiring the unwed mother's consent, but not the unwed father's, bore a
substantial relation to some important state interest. In its decision, the Court
adopted a general test and ultimately held that the distinctions in the statutes
between unmarried mothers and fathers did not bear a substantial relation to the
state's interest in providing adoptive homes for children born out of wedlock. Id.
at 394.
29. 405 U.S. 645 (1972). In Stanley, an unwed couple had lived together for eighteen
years and during that time had three children. Subsequently, the mother died
and, pursuant to state law, the children became wards of the state. Under state
law, unwed fathers were presumed to be unfit. The question before the Court
was whether a presumption that distinguishes and burdens all unwed fathers is
constitutionally repugnant. The Court concluded that the unwed father was enti-
tled to a hearing on his fitness as a parent and that the state, by denying him a
hearing and extending it to all other parents, denied Stanley equal protection of
the laws. I& at 649. In rendering this decision, the Court noted that the Constitu-
tion recognized higher values than speed and efficiency. Id. at 656.
30. Shoecraft v. Catholic Social Servs. Bureau, Inc., 222 Neb. 580, 583, 385 N.W.2d 448,
454 (1986)(Krivosha, C.J., dissenting).
31. Id.
32. Id. at 584, 385 N.W.2d at 454-55.
33. NEB. REV. STAT. § 13-109 (1983)(current version at NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 43-1401 to
-1412 (Cum. Supp. 1986)).
34. Id. § 13-102 (current version at NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-1406 (Cum. Supp. 1986)).
35. Id. § 13-111 (current version at NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-1411 (Cum. Supp. 1986)).
PROTECTING UNWED FATHERS
The final criticism expressed by Chief Justice Krivosha was di-
rectly related to the majority's opinion. The majority stated that the
case before it was not one in which Shoecraft had lived with, nurtured,
or supported the mother or child. Chief Justice Krivosha noted that
the time period prescribed in section 43-104.02 coincides perfectly with
the time the mother and child are in the hospital, thus making it ex-
tremely difficult to establish such a relationship.36
B. In re Application of S.R.S. & M.B.S.
1. Facts
In S.RS. & M.B.S., a child was born on September 2, 1982.37 Prior
to the birth of the child, the putative father and the unwed mother
had lived together and had discussed marriage.38 Despite the fact that
the couple was not married, the father's name appeared on the birth
certificate, and the child bore the father's last name.3 9 Upon leaving
the hospital, the couple lived together with the child for approxi-
mately nineteen months.40 During this time, the putative father pro-
vided financial support for the family and aided in the care of the
child.
On June 10, 1984, the unwed mother, with the child, left the puta-
tive father and moved in with the mother's boyfriend.41 Because of
the secrecy of the mother's address and a subsequent move, the puta-
tive father spent only a limited amount of time with the child.42 In
July of that year, the mother considered placing the child for adop-
tion. On September 28, 1984, the child was released to the Child Sav-
ing Institute without the father's knowledge.43
During this time, the father had contacted the unwed mother's
family several times trying to discover the whereabouts of the child,
but was unsuccessful. Finally, in the first part of February 1985, the
36. Shoecraft v. Catholic Social Servs. Bureau, Inc., 222 Neb. 580, 585, 385 N.W.2d 453,
455 (1986)(Krivosha, C.J., dissenting).
37. In re Application of S.R.S. & M.B.S., 225 Neb. 759, 760,408 N.W.2d 272, 274 (1987).
38. Id. at 760, 408 N.W.2d at 274. The unwed mother chose to remain single. Id.
39. Id. The two parties signed an agreement providing for the child to bear the puta-
tive father's name. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 761, 408 N.W.2d at 274. The unwed couple lived in a number of living ar-
rangements with friends. The child spent time with the paternal grandmother
and various other relatives for short periods of time. At one time, the paternal
grandmother had instituted a proceeding to have herself appointed guardian of
the child. Id.
42. Id. The father saw the child only when the mother left him with the paternal or
maternal grandparents. The father did provide money, diapers, and medication
during the child's stay with relatives. Id.
43. Id. at 762, 408 N.W.2d at 275. The child initially was placed with a foster family
and in October officially was placed with the adoptive parents. Id.
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unwed mother informed the maternal grandmother of the adoption.
Upon receiving this information, the maternal grandmother contacted
the putative father who called the adoption agency and requested the
return of his child. The adoption agency refused to return the child.
In response to this denial, on March 1, 1985, the father filed an intent
to claim paternity.44
On March 27, 1985, the adoptive parents filed a petition for adop-
tion.45 The putative father appeared before the county court to con-
test the adoption proceeding, but his efforts were unsuccessful.
Despite his contentions, the trial court ordered the adoption and held
that the natural father's consent was unnecessary because clear and
convincing evidence pursuant to section 43-104 showed that he had
abandoned the child, and more importantly, his parental rights.46 The
putative father subsequently appealed to the Nebraska Supreme
Court, assigning two errors: (1) that sections 43-104.02 to 43-104.04 are
unconstitutional on their face and as applied to him, and (2) that the
court erred in finding he had abandoned his son during the six-month
period prior to the filing of the adoption petition.47
2. Opinion
The Nebraska Supreme Court reversed the decision of the district
court.48 In the decision, the court first addressed the putative father's
claim that he had not abandoned the child pursuant to section 43-104.
Under this section, the time period within which abandonment must
be shown is the six-month period immediately prior to the filing of the
adoption petition by the adoptive parents.49 The court referred to sev-
eral definitions formulated by other courts5 0 and proposed that, in or-
der to constitute abandonment, a putative father's conduct must
appear by clear and convincing evidence to be willful, intentional, or
voluntary, without just cause or excuse.51 The court held that the pu-
tative father's conduct did not fall within this standard.
44. Id. at 763, 408 N.W.2d at 275. Prior to the adoption, the father did not consent or
intend to relinquish his rights to his son. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. The natural father appealed the decision to the district court, which affirmed
the trial court's holding. Id. at 760, 408 N.W.2d at 273.
47. Id. at 760, 408 N.W.2d at 273-74.
48. Id. at 760, 408 N.W.2d at 273. The Nebraska Supreme Court remanded the case to
the Lancaster County Court to determine who would retain custody of the child.
By stipulated agreement the parties agreed that the child will live with the adop-
tive parents and they will be the child's legal guardians. The natural father re-
ceived liberal visitation rights. Lincoln Journal Star, April 21, 1988, at 1, col. 5.
49. In re Application of S.R.S. & M.B.S., 225 Neb. 759, 764, 408 N.W.2d 272, 276 (1987).
50. In re Adoption of Christofferson, 89 S.D. 287, 290, 232 N.W.2d 832, 834 (1975); In
re Cordo, 41 N.C. App. 503, 507, 255 S.E.2d 440, 442 (1979); Young v. Young, 588
S.W.2d 207, 209 (Mo. App. 1979).
51. In re Application of S.R.S. & M.B.S., 225 Neb. 759, 765, 408 N.W.2d 272, 276 (1987).
[Vol. 67:408
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Second, the court addressed the issue of whether section 43-104.02
was unconstitutional on its face and as applied to the putative father.
The evidence revealed that the putative father had not filed within the
five-day limitation and did not file until two and one-half years had
passed.52 The court noted, however, that for nineteen of the twenty-
four months prior to the child's placement with the agency, the father
had provided for the child and had daily contact with the child.53
Because of this prior custodial relationship, the court found that
the putative father's rights were difficult to distinguish from those of
the mother or a separated or divorced father.54 According to the
court, such a familial bond with the child should afford the father's
rights substantial protection. To substantiate its position, the court
cited Lehr v. Robertson -5 and stated, "when an unwed father demon-
strates a full commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood by
coming forward to participate in the rearing of his child, his interest in
personal contact with his child acquires substantial protection."5 6
Unlike Shoecraft, the court found no compelling interest was
served by the five-day rule.57 Thus, the court held that section 43-
104.02 was unconstitutional as applied and did not allow the adoption
to proceed without the father's consent.
III. ANALYSIS
"But we are here not asked to evaluate the legitimacy of the state
ends, rather, to determine whether the means used to achieve these
ends are constitutionally defensible."58 This statement by the Stanley
Court appropriately expresses the focus of this Note's analysis. The
Nebraska legislature enacted sections 43-104.02 to 43-104.04 to remove
the doubt surrounding an adoption and to expedite the adoption pro-
cess of children born out of wedlock. The ends sought by the legisla-
ture are commendable. The means, however, are constitutionally
suspect.
The major issue for resolution is whether the five-day filing re-
quirement of section 43-104.02 provides putative fathers in Nebraska
sufficient protection pursuant to the due process and equal protection
clauses. To fully develop the analysis surrounding this question, the
52. Id. at 767, 408 N.W.2d at 277.
53. Id. at 768, 408 N.W.2d at 278.
54. Id.
55. 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
56. In re Application of S.R.S. & M.B.S., 225 Neb. 759,768,408 N.W.2d 272,278 (1987).
57. The court stated that, in Shoecraft, the filing requirement provided a legitimate
means of attaining the rapid placement of newborns. No such compelling interest
would be served by allowing a two-year relationship to be severed for a failure to
file within five days. Id. at 769, 408 N.W.2d at 278-79.
58. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 652 (1972).
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five-day provisions will be evaluated in light of the previously dis-
cussed Nebraska Supreme Court decisions and the relevant United
States Supreme Court decisions.
A. Due Process
The first question which must be resolved regarding the due pro-
cess analysis is whether the Nebraska five-day statutes adequately
protect a putative father's opportunity to develop a relationship with
his child or, more succinctly, his opportunity interest. The Supreme
Court has specifically addressed the issue of whether a registry system
sufficiently protects an unwed father's opportunity to form an incho-
ate relationship with his child.
In Lehr v. Robertson,59 a child was born out of wedlock on Novem-
ber 9, 1976. Eight months after the birth, the mother married Richard
Robertson. When the child was two years old, the couple filed an
adoption petition, and ultimately an order of adoption was awarded.
The natural father subsequently filed a suit contending that the adop-
tion order was invalid because he was not given advance notice of the
adoption proceeding. The Court considered whether New York had
sufficiently protected the unmarried father's inchoate relationship
with a child he had never supported and had rarely seen in two years.
The Court ultimately held that the New York registry statutes did
sufficiently protect the putative father's interest in establishing a rela-
tionship with his child.60
Although the Supreme Court held that the registry system did pro-
vide the putative father with adequate protection, two factors conceiv-
ably were afforded great weight by the Lehr Court and could have
affected the Court's decision regarding New York's statutory protec-
tion of an unwed father's opportunity interest. First, the timing of the
putative father's claim in Lehr significantly hindered his chances of
establishing his opportunity claim.61 The biological father did not
seek to establish a legal tie with his daughter until she was two years
old.
The second major factor that could have contributed to the Court's
denial of the putative father's opportunity interest was the relation-
ship between the prospective adoptive parents. The Court was not
59. 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
60. Id. at 265.
61. Several statements made by the Lehr Court signify the impact of the timing of
the putative father's claim on his opportunity interest. In regard to the putative
father, the Court stated, "[a]ppellant has never had any significant custodial, per-
sonal, or financial relationship with Jessica, and he did not seek to establish a
legal tie until after she was two years old." Id. at 262. In addition, the Court, in its
statement of the issue, made specific reference to the delay in the father's claim
for paternity. Id. at 249.
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faced with a proposed adoption that would have placed the child with
an unfamiliar set of parents. Rather, the adoption merely gave recog-
nition to a family unit already in existence.6 2
After Lehr, it is still questionable whether a registry system ade-
quately protects a putative father's opportunity to form a relationship
with his newborn child. Several statements made by the Lehr Court
stress the importance of affording unwed fathers with such an inter-
est.63 The most significant statement made by the Court concerning a
father's opportunity interest was that:
The significance of the biological connection is that it offers the natural father
an opportunity that no other male possesses to develop a relationship with his
offspring. If he grasps that opportunity and accepts some measure of respon-
sibility for the child's future, he may enjoy the blessings of the parent-child
relationship and make uniquely valuable contributions to the child's
development.6 4
The emphasized words expressly provide that a father must be af-
forded the opportunity to develop a relationship with his child.
The Nebraska Supreme Court in Shoecraft was confronted with
the question of the constitutional validity of section 43-104.02. The
court, however, failed to discuss the issue of whether the five-day
scheme adequately protected Shoecraft's opportunity to form a rela-
tionship with his child. The court determined that because Shoecraft
had merely a biological connection with the child, rather than a custo-
dial relationship, the lack of a notice provision could not render the
scheme unconstitutional.6 5
Several statements made by the Shoecraft court show why
Shoecraft was not afforded his protected opportunity interest. First,
62. The Lehr Court, in a footnote, clearly communicated the impact of the nature of
the proposed adoptive parents on its decision to uphold the New York statutes as
constitutional:
This case happens to involve an adoption by the husband of the natural
mother, but we do not believe the natural father has any greater right to
object to such an adoption than to an adoption by two total strangers. If
anything, the balance of equities tips the opposite way in a case such as
this. In denying the putative father relief in Quilloin v. Walcott, 434
U.S. 246 (1978), we made an observation equally applicable here:
"Nor is this a case in which the proposed adoption would place the child
with a new set of parents with whom the child had never before lived.
Rather, the result of the adoption in this case is to give full recognition to
a family unit already in existence, a result desired by all concerned, ex-
cept appellant. Whatever might be required in other situations, we can-
not say that the State was required in this situation to find anything
more than that the adoption, and denial of legitimation, were in the best
interests of the child."'
Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 262 n.19 (1983).
63. In its decision, the Court repeatedly acknowledged the existence of the putative
father's opportunity interest. Id. at 262-63.
64. Id. at 262 (emphasis added)(footnote omitted).




the court acknowledged that the five-day filing period was selected
because it was the standard length of time a child and mother remain
in the hospital following birth.66 Second, the court stated that "[t]his
is not a case where he [the father] lived with the child and nurtured
and supported it and the mother."67 Finally, the court stated that,
"until after the birth, he (the putative father) exhibited (at least fi-
nancially) no responsibility for the child or the mother."6 8
The above statements by the Shoecraft court are illogical and con-
fusing. The court stressed the fact that Shoecraft had not established
a relationship with his child. Section 43-104.02, however, provides the
putative father only five days after the birth of the child to do so. In
addition, the mother and the child are generally in the hospital during
this five-day period. Such a situation makes it difficult for the father
to establish a relationship with his child.
Pursuant to section 43-104.02, a putative father can protect his
rights by registering with the Department of Social Services any time
during the pregnancy and up to five days after the birth of the child.69
Although this time period appears reasonable, this Note contends that
the time period is unreasonable and precludes the putative father's
opportunity to develop a relationship with his child. Several factors
support this conclusion.
First, section 43-104.02 presumes that a putative father can develop
a relationship with his child prior to the child's birth based upon an
extension of his relationship with the child's mother during her preg-
nancy70 and the hospital stay. The Nebraska Supreme Court in
Shoecraft acknowledged this presumption when it stated, "until after
the birth, he exhibited (at least financially) no responsibility for the
child or the mother."7 1 Such a presumption, however, is false.
Although the father can develop an attachment to the child during the
pregnancy,72 he cannot develop a relationship with the child prior to
the birth by providing financial support to the unwed mother.
Second, the unique nature of the nonmarital relationship, in con-
junction with the potential confusion and uncertainty that surround
the relationship, demand a more reasonable filing period. The state
may argue that the putative father has nine months and five days to
file the form. During the course of the pregnancy, however, the un-
66. Id. at 579, 385 N.W.2d at 452.
67. Id. at 580, 385 N.W.2d at 452.
68. Id.
69. NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-104.02 (1984).
70. See generally Case Comments, Domestic Relations-Parental Rights of the Puta-
tive Father: Equal Protection and Due Process Considerations, 14 MEM. ST. U.L.
REv. 259 (1984).
71. Shoecraft v. Catholic Social Servs. Bureau, Inc., 222 Neb. 574, 580, 385 N.W.2d 448,
452 (1986).
72. S. HANSON & F. BozETr, DIMENSIONS OF FATHERHOOD 98 (1985).
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wed couple must make a decision regarding the child's future. The
alternatives confronting the unwed couple in regard to their relation-
ship and the child's fate are numerous and perplexing. The unwed
mother and father are forced to decide whether to marry, whether to
stay single, whether to place the child for adoption, whether to keep
the child, or whether to live together and raise the child.
Finally, the State of Nebraska assumes the father has knowledge
of the filing requirement.7 3 The uncertainty and confusion described
above, however, may preclude the unwed father from discovering the
filing requirement until after the expiration of the five-day period. In
an unwed relationship, the father may depend upon representations
made by the unwed mother regarding the child's future and the un-
wed couple's future. Because of these representations, the father may
forgo his opportunity to seek legal counsel and, ultimately, his oppor-
tunity to discover his "protected" rights under the Nebraska statutory
scheme. In such a case, the fragile rights of the unwed father should
outweigh the efficiency which the state achieves by implementing this
five-day statute of limitations.74
The second part of this due process analysis will show why section
43-104.02 fails to provide adequate constitutional protection to custo-
dial fathers. The Supreme Court first addressed the protected rights
of custodial fathers in Stanley v. Illinois.75 In Stanley, the unwed
mother lived with the unwed father intermittently for eighteen years.
During this time, the couple had three children. The unwed mother
subsequently died, and the children, pursuant to Illinois law, became
wards of the state.76 Following a dependency proceeding, the children
were placed with court-appointed guardians. The Supreme Court held
that as a matter of due process, Stanley was entitled to a hearing in
regard to his fitness as a parent before his children could be taken
from him.77
During the proceeding, the State of Illinois claimed that most un-
wed fathers are unsuitable and neglectful parents.78 The Court re-
sponded by stating, "[b]ut not all unwed fathers are in this category;
73. The Supreme Court in Lehr did not accept the putative father's "ignorance of the
law" excuse. In regard to this excuse, the Court stated, "[tihe possibility that he
may have failed to do so because of his ignorance of the law cannot be a sufficient
reason for criticizing the law itself." Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 264 (1983).
74. See infra text accompanying note 87.
75. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
76. Under Illinois law, the unwed father was presumed to be unfit. Id.
77. Id. at 649 (1972). In addition, the Court held that by denying him a hearing and
extending it to all other parents whose custody of their children is challenged, the
State denied Stanley the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the four-
teenth amendment. Id.
78. Id. at 654 (footnote omitted).
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some are wholly suited to have custody of their children."79 The
Court noted that had Stanley been afforded a proper hearing, he may
have been found to be deserving of the custody of his children.8 0
The Nebraska five-day statutory scheme operates in a manner sim-
ilar to the Illinois presumption statutes. Under the Nebraska scheme,
a custodial father could have lived with, supported, and aided in the
rearing of his child, but if he failed to file the intent to claim paternity
form, his rights would be terminated.8 ' In essence, the Nebraska stat-
utes presume that all putative fathers who fail to file the proper piece
of paper with the Department of Social Services are unfit.
In conclusion, section 43-104.02 does not protect the opportunity in-
terests of custodial fathers or fathers of newborns. The Nebraska
Supreme Court in Shoecraft upheld the constitutionality of the five-
day statutes and thus denied fathers of newborns, such as Shoecraft, a
reasonable opportunity to establish a relationship with their children.
Further, the five-day statutory scheme attempts to exclude fathers
who have established a significant interest in their children from par-
ticipating in their children's adoption proceedings. Subsequently,
however, the Nebraska Supreme Court, in In re S.R.S. & M.B.S.,82 rec-
ognized a substantially protected right and held section 43-104.02 un-
constitutional in relation to custodial fathers. Pursuant to this
decision, custodial fathers in Nebraska should be afforded their pro-
tected rights.
B. Equal Protection
The United States Supreme Court evaluates a putative father's
equal protection claim in a manner similar to an evaluation of the fa-
ther's rights under the due process clause.8 3 Essentially, the Court
looks at whether a substantial relationship exists between the unwed
parent and the child. Thus, when the unwed mother and the unwed
father are similarly situated with regard to their relationship with the
child, statutes differentiating between the two parties may not be con-
stitutionally applied. If the father has not come forward to participate
in the rearing of the child, however, the Court generally, has held that
nothing in the equal protection clause precludes the state from with-
79. Id. (footnote omitted).
80. Id. at 655.
81. Shoecraft v. Catholic Social Servs. Bureau, Inc., 222 Neb. 574, 583, 385 N.W.2d 448,
454 (1986)(Krivosha, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Krivosha used similar rea-
soning in support of his equal protection argument. Id.
82. 225 Neb. 759, 408 N.W.2d 272 (1987).
83. The Lehr Court stressed the importance of a custodial relationship in regard to a
putative father's constitutional rights. "As we have already explained, the exist-
ence or nonexistence of a substantial relationship between parent and child is a
relevant criterion in evaluating both the rights of the parent and the best inter-
ests of the child." Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 266-67 (1983).
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holding from him the privilege of vetoing the adoption of his child.84
The United States Supreme Court, in Caban v. Mohammed,85 pro-
vided a test to determine whether the above differences in treatment
are permissible under the equal protection clause. The Caban test
provides that "[g]ender based distinctions 'must serve important gov-
ernmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement
of these objectives' in order to withstand judicial scrutiny under the
Equal Protection Clause."8 6
In Caban, an unwed mother and father lived together and repre-
sented themselves as being husband and wife. While living together,
the unwed mother gave birth to two children. During this time the
father lived with the children and contributed to the support of the
family. After approximately five years, the mother took the two chil-
dren and took up residence with, and later married, a different man.
Subsequently, the parents filed conflicting claims for the adoption
of the children. The surrogate noted the limited rights of unwed fa-
thers in adoption proceedings and granted the mother's petition,
thereby cutting off all of the father's rights and obligations. In ad-
dressing the unwed father's equal protection claim, the Court held
that the distinction made by the New York adoption laws did not bear
a substantial relation to the state's interest in providing adoptive
homes for children born out of wedlock.
The reasons for such a conclusion were twofold. First, the Caban
Court noted that a court should have no trouble identifying or locating
a father who has established a custodial relationship with his child.
Second, the Court found that although a putative father may object to
the adoption of his child, this impediment to the adoption is the result
of a natural parental interest and is shared by both genders alike.87
The applicable state interests associated with sections 43-104.02 to
43-104.04 can be identified by referring to the legislative history of the
bill. According to the legislative history, the bill was designed to elim-
inate the undue delays, the doubt, and the cloud that hangs over such
adoption proceedings.8 8 More specifically, the state's interests are the
prompt and efficient placement of children born out of wedlock, final-
ity in the adoption proceeding, and the elimination of embarrassment
to the mother, adoptive parents, and child caused by the publication of
84. Id. at 276.
85. 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
86. Id. at 388 (quoting Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976)).
87. Id. at 391-92. In addition, the Court noted that "[n]either the State nor the appel-
lees have argued that unwed fathers are more likely to object to the adoption of
their children than are unwed mothers; nor is there any self-evident reason why
as a class they would be." Id. at 392.




The distinctions between an unwed mother's rights and an unwed
father's rights under section 43-104.02 are easily identifiable. The un-
wed mother is entitled to custody of the child, and custody cannot be
taken from her absent evidence of unfitness and proof that the re-
moval is in the best interests of the child. In addition, the mother's
custody is automatic unless terminated after notice and a fair
hearing.90
In direct contrast, a putative father has no automatic right to cus-
tody. He must file a form with the Department of Social Services
within five days after the birth of the child and must establish pater-
nity in a judicial proceeding. A failure to file will result in termina-
tion of all his rights in relation to the child.91 If the mother decides to
relinquish the baby for adoption, the unwed father must meet three
conditions in order to successfully contest the proposed relinquish-
ment. The father must show that he is a fit parent, able to properly
care for the child, and that the child's best interests will be served by
granting custody to him.92
Application of the Caban test to the fact pattern in S.RS. & M.B.S.
demands a conclusion that the gender-based distinctions in section 43-
104.02 fail to bear a substantial relationship to the state's interests. In
S.R.S. & MB.S., the putative father came forward to participate in the
support and rearing of his child for nineteen of the child's first
twenty-four months of life. A court would have no trouble identifying
or locating the unwed father. A reasonable inquiry by the court of the
mother, relatives of the mother, or a review of the birth certificate
would have revealed both the father's identity and his location. Be-
cause the identification and location of the unwed father were readily
available to the court, the adoption proceeding would not be subjected
to any significant delays. In addition, knowledge of such information
would eliminate the need for publication of notice and thus preclude
embarrassment to the interested parties. As a result, the different
treatment accorded to unwed mothers and custodial unwed fathers
does not bear a substantial relationship to the interests of the State of
Nebraska in expediting the adoption process, promoting finality, or
eliminating the embarrassment of the parties. Accordingly, the dispa-
rate treatment imposed by section 43-104.02 should be
impermissible.93
89. Shoecraft v. Catholic Social Servs. Bureau, Inc., 222 Neb. 574, 579, 385 N.W.2d 448,
452 (1986).
90. Id. at 578, 385 N.W.2d at 451-52.
91. The Shoecraft court specified the differences in treatment found in section 43-
104.02. Id. at 579, 385 N.W.2d at 452.
92. The Shoecrqft court further addressed the distinctions present in section 43-
104.06(1). Id. at 578-79, 385 N.W.2d at 452.
93. See id at 578, 385 N.W.2d at 451-52.
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Historically, the states have afforded the mother greater rights be-
cause she is the one who has carried the child and the one who must
ultimately bear the child.94 This Note, however, contends that the
common law distinctions drawn between unwed mothers and fathers
of newborns are outdated95 and can no longer deny putative fathers
equal protection.
The above conclusion is supported by the fact that the unwed
mother and the unwed father are equally competent caretakers. Stud-
ies by a number of respected psychologists reveal that most stereotypi-
cal associations are erroneous. The results of these studies indicate
that fathers, much like mothers, are capable of sensitive interaction
with their infants, are responsive to the needs of the child, and most
importantly, are competent caretakers.9 6 In regard to the children,
psychologists have found that children form attachments to both par-
ents at approximately the same time and, in addition, display no pref-
erence for one parent over the other.7
One psychologist, Michael Lamb, adeptly addressed the distinction:
"With the exception of lactation, there is no evidence that women are
biologically predisposed to be better parents than men are."9 8 Essen-
tially, the only distinction between the unwed mother and the unwed
father is gender. When the parties are similarly situated, the Supreme
Court has held that statutes containing gender-based distinctions may
not be constitutionally applied.99
Application of the Caban test to the Shoecraft case further sup-
ports a conclusion that the five-day statutes are constitutionally inva-
lid under the equal protection clause. More specifically, the gender-
based distinctions inherent in the five-day statutory scheme are not
94. Justice Stevens' reasoning in his dissenting opinion in Caban typifies the histori-
cal reasoning behind such distinctions. In his dissenting opinion, he stated:
[B]oth parents are equally responsible for the conception of the child out
of wedlock. But from that point on through pregnancy and infancy, the
differences between the male and the female have an important impact
on the child's destiny. Only the mother carries the child; it is she who
has the constitutional right to decide whether to bear it or not. In many
cases, only the mother knows who sired the child, and it will often be
within her power to withhold that fact, and even the fact of her preg-
nancy, from that person.
Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 404-405 (1979)(Stevens, J., dissent-
ing)(footnotes omitted).
95. Shoecraft v. Catholic Social Servs. Bureau, Inc., No. 85-391, slip op. 287, 299 (Lan-
caster County Dist. Ct. June 14, 1985).
96. M. LAmB, THE ROLE OF THE FATHER IN CHID DEVELOPMENT 437, 479 (1981).
97. S. HANSON & F. BozrT, supr note 72; M. LAmB supra note 96.
98. M. LAMB, supra note 96, at 479.
99. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983). The Court in Lehr stated- "[w]e have held
that these statutes may not constitutionally be applied in that class of cases where
the mother and father are in fact similarly situated with regard to their relation-
ship with the child." Id. at 267.
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substantially related to an important state interest. The important
state interests identified by the Legislature will be addressed
individually.
First, the Legislature was concerned with eliminating the embar-
rassment suffered by the mother and the illegitimate child that would
result from the judicial proceedings and the publication of notice. The
viability of this interest today is questionable. Since the enactment of
section 43-104.02 in 1975, the annual number of children born out of
wedlock in the State of Nebraska has almost doubled, and in 1986 com-
prised approximately fifteen percent of all births.100 Arguably, the
stigma formerly associated with illegitimacy has subsided and is negli-
gible. Thus, no showing has been made that the distinctions made
under section 43-104.02 bear a substantial relationship to the pro-
claimed interest of eliminating embarrassment to the mother and
child.
The second identifiable interest suggested by the Legislature is the
prompt placement of children born out of wedlock. Several specific
problems can be attributed to this interest. One problem is the reluc-
tance of the unwed father to consent to the adoption of his child. The
Caban Court, however, dispelled the one-sided nature of this problem
and stated that this reluctance was the result of a natural parental
interest shared by both genders alike.lol
Two additional, interrelated problems associated with the prompt
placement interest are the identification and location of the unwed
father. Admittedly, the five-day statutes eliminate these two
problems by not requiring the court to perform these tasks. Thus, the
five-day statutes, in some cases, further the state's interest in expedit-
ing the adoption process.
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Reed v. Reed 302
could arguably demand a conclusion that the methodology imple-
mented by sections 43-104.02 to 43-104.04 to accomplish the prompt
placement of children born out of wedlock violates the equal protec-
tion clause. In Reed, a mother and father separately filed petitions in
probate court seeking appointment as administrator of their adoptive
son's estate. The Idaho Code compelled a preference for males, and as
a result the father was designated as the administrator.
The question presented to the Reed Court was whether a differ-
ence in the sex of competing applicants for letters of administration
bore a rational relationship to a state objective sought to be achieved
by the operation of the statute. 103 The Court held that although the
100. NEBRASKA DEP'T OF HEALTH Div. OF HEALTH DATA AND STATISTICAL.RESEARCH,
UNWED ADOPTIONS FOR YEARS 1975-1986.
101. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 391-92 (1979).
102. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
103. Id. at 76. The objective of the state was to reduce the workload of the probate
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statute reduced the workload on the probate courts, the statute failed
to achieve that objective in a manner consistent with the commands of
the equal protection clause.104
Although the Nebraska Legislature never explicitly stated that it
sought to eliminate one class of contestants, the enactment of the five-
day statutes accomplished such an end. Admittedly, the five-day
scheme does, in most cases, expedite the adoption process and dimin-
ish the workload of the courts by not requiring the courts to attempt
to identify or locate the putative fathers. Pursuant to the Supreme
Court's decision in Reed, however, the scheme accomplishes this inter-
est in a discriminatory manner. Preference to unwed mothers merely
for purposes related to administrative ease is an example of arbitrary
legislation prohibited by the equal protection clause.105
IV. SOURCE OF THE PROBLEM
The constitutional deficiencies of Nebraska's five-day statutory
scheme can be directly attributed to the Nebraska Legislature. A
careful review of the statute itself and the legislative history reveals a
blatant disregard for the rights of unwed fathers. The record evi-
dences an overwhelming concern for the adoptive parents and for the
rapid placement of children born out of wedlock. This unbalanced
concern can be attributed to the interests of the creators of the statute
and the persons testifying in favor of it.106
The overzealous concern by the state for a quick and efficient de-
termination of parental rights prompted the passage of an unconstitu-
tional statutory scheme. Although the state's interest in an efficient
adoption procedure is important, this interest is not so important as to
justify the implementation of unconstitutional means. The Stanley
Court aptly addressed the propriety of such an "efficient" procedure:
The establishment of prompt efficacious procedures to achieve legitimate
state ends is a proper state interest worthy of cognizance in constitutional ad-
judication. But the Constitution recognizes higher values than speed and effi-
courts by eliminating one class of contests. In regard to this objective, the Court
noted that the crucial question was whether the statute advanced that objective
in a manner consistent with the command of the equal protection clause. Id.
104. Id. In addition, the Reed Court stated:
To give a mandatory preference to members of either sex over members
of the other, merely to accomplish the elimination of hearings on the
merits, is to make the very kind of arbitrary legislative choice forbidden
by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; and
whatever may be said as to the positive values of avoiding intrafamily
controversy, the choice in this context may not lawfully be mandated
solely on the basis of sex.
Id. at 76-77.
105. Id. at 76.
106. Hearing, supra note 5. Those in favor of the bill included representatives of local
adoption agencies and attorneys representing adoptive parents.
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ciency. Indeed, one might fairly say of the Bill of Rights in general, and the
Due Process Clause in particular, that they were designed to protect the frag-
ile values of a vulnerable citizenry from the overbearing concern for efficiency
and efficacy that may characterize praiseworthy government officials no less,
and perhaps more, than mediocre ones.1 0 7
The most disconcerting factor regarding the statutory scheme is
the apparent randomness in the selection of the five-day period and
the lack of justification for its implementation. The legislative history
fails to reveal any reference by the promoters of the bill or by the
Legislature to any outside resource to justify their ultimate choice.
Admittedly, the child's interests should be paramount and should be
afforded great protection, but the necessity of such a short filing pe-
riod is unjustified.
The Legislature's failure to refer to outside resources may have
contributed to an unfair balancing of the interests of the adoptive par-
ents, the unwed mother, the putative father, and the child. Psycholog-
ical research refutes the extreme necessity of such an early placement
of the child. Several prominent psychologists have specifically ad-
dressed the timing of a child's attachment to his parents.
It is generally believed that infants are not attached to anyone until they at-
tain six to eight months of age (compare Ainsworth 1969; Lamb 1978). It is
only at this age that infants have matured cognitively to such an extent that
they have a primitive but adequate conception of the independent and perma-
nent existence of other persons (compare Bell 1970; Decarie 1965). Further-
more, it is only at this age that infants begin to protest reliably when
separated from their parents (Ainsworth 1962; Bowlby 1973).108
Reference to the above research and similar psychological attachment
findings could have conceivably induced a more thoughtful filing pe-
riod selection.
Whether the Legislature actually sought to deny the putative fa-
ther of his right to notice and the opportunity for consent, the statute
provides on its face for a similar result.109 The five-day provision func-
tions much like a statute of limitationsilo in that neither the state nor
the petitioner need provide notice of the pending deadline and igno-
rance of the deadline by the putative father is no excuse. Those fa-
thers who let the statute run are afforded no recourse.
V. STATUTORY REFORM
In the aftermath of the two recent Nebraska Supreme Court deci-
107. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656 (1972).
108. Lamb, The Development of Parent Infant Attachments in the First Two Years of
Life, THE FATHER-INFANT RELATIONSHIP 23 (F. Pedersen ed. 1980).
109. Shoecraft v. Catholic Social Servs. Bureau, Inc., 222 Neb. 574, 583, 385 N.W.2d 448,
454 (1986)(Krivosha, C.J., dissenting).
110. Hearing, supra note 5 (statement of Eleanor Swanson).
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sions,"1 1 the Legislature should consider a revision of the existing stat-
utes or the enactment of a new scheme. The objective of this section
of the Note is to provide a statutory scheme that affirmatively governs
the adoption proceeding of children born out of wedlock. In order to
effectively accomplish this task, consideration must be given to the in-
terests of all parties, namely the mother, the natural father, the child,
and the adoptive parents.
The delicate nature of such a proceeding demands a scheme that
offers a careful balancing of the aforementioned parties' interests.
The Uniform Parentage Act (UPA)112 effectively balances the inter-
ests of all the relevant parties. This statutory scheme includes three
sections that directly correspond to the Nebraska five-day statutes. 1 3
111. Shoecraft v. Catholic Social Servs. Bureau, Inc., 222 Neb. 574, 385 N.W.2d 448
(1986); In re Application of S.R.S. & M.B.S., 225 Neb. 759, 408 N.W.2d 272 (1987).
112. UNIF. PARENTAGE AcT, 9B U.L.A. 295 (1973).
113. The three provisions of the Uniform Parentage Act scrutinized in this section are
sections 4, 24, and 25.
§ 4. Presumption of Paternity.
(a) A man is presumed to be the natural father of a child if:
(1) he and the child's natural mother are or have been married
to each other and the child is born during the marriage, or within 300
days after the marriage is terminated by death, annulment, declaration
of invalidity, or divorce, or after a decree of separation is entered by a
court;
(2) before the child's birth, he and the child's natural mother
have attempted to marry each other by a marriage solemnized in appar-
ent compliance with law, although the attempted marriage is or could be
declared invalid, and,
(i) if the attempted marriage could be declared invalid
only by a court, the child is born during the attempted marriage, or
within 300 days after its termination by death, annulment, declaration of
invalidity, or divorce; or
(ii) if the attempted marriage is invalid without a court
order, the child is born within 300 days after the termination of cohabita-
tion;
(3) after the child's birth, he and the child's natural mother
have married, or attempted to marry, each other by a marriage solem-
nized in apparent compliance with law, although the attempted marriage
is or could be declared invalid, and
(i) he has acknowledged his paternity of the child in writ-
ing filed with the [appropriate court or Vital Statistics Bureau],
(ii) with his consent, he is named as the child's father on
the child's birth certificate, or
(iii) he is obligated to support the child under a written
voluntary promise or by court order,
(4) while the child is under the age of majority, he receives the
child into his home and openly holds out the child as his natural child; or
(5) he acknowledges his paternity of the child in a writing filed
with the [appropriate court or Vital Statistics Bureau], which shall
promptly inform the mother of the filing of the acknowledgement, and
she does not dispute the acknowledgement within a reasonable time af-
ter being informed thereof, in a writing filed with the [appropriate court
or Vital Statistics Bureau]. If another man is presumed under this sec-
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In direct contrast to the Nebraska statutes, however, the UPA pro-
vides the putative father with significant protection.
tion to be the child's father, acknowledgement may be effected only with
the written consent of the presumed father or after the presumption has
been rebutted.
(b) A presumption under this section may be rebutted in an appro-
priate action only by clear and convincing evidence. If two or more pre-
sumptions arise which conflict with each other, the presumption which
on the facts is founded on the weightier considerations of policy and logic
controls. The presumption is rebutted by a court decree establishing pa-
ternity of the child by another man.
Id. § 4, 9B U.L.A. at 298-99.
§ 24. When Notice of Adoption Proceeding Required. If a mother relin-
quishes or proposes to relinquish for adoption a child who has (1) a pre-
sumed father under Section 4(a), (2) a father whose relationship to the
child has been determined by a court, or (3) a father as to whom the
child is a legitimate child under prior law of this State or under the law
of another jurisdiction, the father shall be given notice of the adoption
proceeding and have the rights provided under [the appropriate State
statute] [the Revised Uniform Adoption Act], unless the father's rela-
tionship to the child has been previously terminated or determined by a
court not to exist.
Id. § 24, 9B U.L.A. at 336.
§ 25. Proceeding to Terminate Parental Rights.
(a) If a mother relinquishes or proposes to relinquish for adoption a
child who does not have (1) a presumed father under Section 4(a), (2) a
father whose relationship to the child has been determined by a court, or
(3) a father as to whom the child is a legitimate child under prior law of
this State or under the law of another jurisdiction, or if a child otherwise
becomes the subject of an adoption proceeding, the agency or person to
whom the child has been or is to be relinquished, or the mother or the
person having custody of the child, shall file a petition in the
[ J court to terminate the parental rights of the father, unless
the father's relationship to the child has been previously terminated or
determined by a court not to exist.
(b) In an effort to identify the natural father, the court shall cause
inquiry to be made of the mother and any other appropriate person. The
inquiry shall include the following whether the mother was married at
the time of conception of the child or at any time thereafter, whether the
mother was cohabiting with a man at the time of conception or birth of
the child; whether the mother has received support payments or
promises of support with respect to the child or in connection with her
pregnancy; or whether any man has formally or informally acknowl-
edged or declared his possible paternity of the child.
(c) If, after the inquiry, the natural father is identified to the satis-
faction of the court, or if more than one man is identified as a possible
father, each shall be given notice of the proceeding in accordance with
Subsection (e). If any of them fails to appear or, if appearing, fails to
claim custodial rights, his parental rights with reference to the child
shall be terminated. If the natural father or a man representing himself
to be the natural father, claims custodial rights, the court shall proceed
to determine custodial rights.
(d) If, after the inquiry, the court is unable to identify the natural
father or any possible natural father and no person has appeared claim-
ing to be the natural father and claiming custodial rights, the court shall
enter an order terminating the unknown natural father's parental rights
with reference to the child. Subject to the disposition of an appeal upon
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First, section 4 of the TJPA, "The Presumption of Paternity," enu-
merates various situations in which a putative father is presumed to be
the child's biological father, and, as a result, formal proceedings to es-
tablish paternity are not necessary.114 Second, section 24 of the UPA
specifically defines when notice of the adoption proceeding must be
accorded to the father. Under this section, three specific categories of
fathers must be afforded notice.1"5 Finally, section 25 of the UPA,
"Proceeding to Terminate Parental Rights," is a natural extension of
section 24. This section addresses situations in which the father of the
child has not been ascertained in accordance with section 24 and fur-
ther allows for the termination of the parental rights of the natural
father.
A comparison of the above sections and the Nebraska five-day stat-
utory scheme reveals several significant differences. Essentially, the
UPA allows the court to examine and protect the relationships be-
tween the parties in addition to providing a means for the putative
father to affirmatively assert paternity. More importantly, section 4
protects fathers who have taken some affirmative action in regard to
the familial relationship and his child. In comparison, section 43-
104.02 fails to protect fathers who have established, or attempted to
establish, a relationship with their children. Pursuant to the Ne-
braska statute, a father can only assert paternity by filing a notice
with the Department of Social Services.
A second difference is found in section 24 of the UPA. This section
requires the court to provide notice to putative fathers who have es-
tablished a custodial relationship with their children, regardless of re-
gistration. The Nebraska statutory scheme, on the other hand, limits
notice of the adoption proceeding to only those persons who have af-
firmatively registered. A third implicit difference is the automatic ter-
mination characteristic of section 43-104.02. Pursuant to section 43-
the expiration of [6 months] after an order terminating parental rights is
issued under this subsection, the order cannot be questioned by any per-
son, in any manner, or upon any ground, including fraud, misrepresenta-
tion, failure to give any required notice, or lack of jurisdiction of the
parties or of the subject matter.
(e) Notice of the proceeding shall be given to every person identi-
fied as the natural person or a possible natural father [in the manner
appropriate under rules of civil procedure for the service of process in a
civil action in this state, or] in any manner the court directs. Proof of
giving the notice shall be filed with the court before the petition is heard.
[If no person has been identified as the natural father or a possible fa-
ther, the court, on the basis of all information available, shall determine
whether publication or public posting of notice of the proceeding is likely
to lead to identification and, if so, shall order publication or public post-
ing at times and in places and manner it deems appropriate.]
Id. § 25, 9B U.L.A. at 339-40.
114. Id. § 4, 9B U.L.A. at 298.
- 115. Id. § 24, 9B U.L.A. at 336.
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104.02, a trial judge is not required to attempt to identify or locate the
father, nor is he required to determine whether publication is neces-
sary. Essentially, the Nebraska statutory scheme acts as a closed
schemel16 that affords the trial judge no discretion in the notice of
termination decisions.
The aforementioned sections of the UPA offer several substantive
advantages to the parties involved in an adoption proceeding. First,
the UPA provides adequate protection of the putative father's inter-
ests in his child. The statutory means include the presumption of pa-
ternity, a putative father registry, the requirement of judicial inquiry,
and notice through publication. Subsections (b) through (e) of section
25 act to assure the state that concerned fathers who are unaware of
the registry system are adequately protected.117
Next, the UPA affords adoptive parents and the child an efficient
adoption process. Two particular aspects of this statutory scheme pro-
mote efficiency. First, the UPA seeks to identify the natural father in
order to determine his potential interest in his child.118 Second, sec-
tion 25(d) acts much like a statute of limitations in that it provides a
specific date after which a father may not reopen a judgment termi-
nating his parental rights.119 Such a system alleviates the doubt and
uncertainty that commonly surround an adoption proceeding, and fur-
ther, it enables the court to quickly terminate an uninterested puta-
tive father's rights.
A third inherent advantage of this statutory scheme is promotion
of the finality of adoption proceedings and further attempts to elimi-
nate the doubts of the interested parties. Subsections (c) and (d) of
section 23 firmly address this issue and offer no recourse to uninter-
ested fathers who fail to appear or appeal.120
Upon reviewing the above advantages, one cumulative advantage
can be identified. The UPA attempts to balance the interests of the
parties involved in an adoption proceeding.
Several disadvantages related to the UPA scheme are noteworthy
and deserve discussion. First, pursuant to section 25(d), a putative fa-
ther is allowed six months to appeal an order terminating his rights.
Although attachment between a child and an adult generally does not
occur until six to eight months after birth,121 the six-month time pe-
riod is unduly burdensome upon the adoptive parents. Several states
that have adopted the UPA have, therefore, reduced the time period
116. See generally Note, Putative Father's Right to Notice of Adoption Proceedings
Involving His Child, 49 Mo. L. REV. 650, 663 (1984).
117. UNIF. PARENTAGE AcT § 25 (b-e), 9B U.L.A. 295, 339-40 (1973).
118. Id. § 25(b), 9B U.L.A. at 340.
119. Id. § 25(d), 9B U.L.A. at 340.
120. Id. § 25(c), (d), 9B U.L.A. at 340.
121. See Lamb, supra note 108, at 23.
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allowed for appealing the termination order.122
The amount of time afforded a putative father to appeal involves a
balancing of two interests. First, the interested fathers should be af-
forded ample time to protect their inherent rights. Because of the in-
definite character of the nonmarital relationship, a father may be
unaware of the birth of the child or unable to determine the child's
location. Adequate time should be afforded to a father who has an
interest in forming a relationship with his child. Second, the time pe-
riod chosen should be related to the adoptive parents' interest. Unlike
the child's attachment to his parents, the adoptive parents' attachment
to the child begins much sooner, and, accordingly, their attachment
rights should be protected. A period of thirty days from the termina-
tion proceeding should adequately afford the father sufficient time to
appeal the court's determination. Additionally, the attachment be-
tween the adoptive parents and the child would be considerably less in
a thirty-day period as opposed to the six-month period prescribed by
the UPA.
A second disadvantage to the UPA statutory scheme is the signifi-
cant amount of discretion afforded to the judge. Under subsection (e),
great deference is given to the court to determine whether publication
or the public posting of notice is likely to lead to the notification of the
putative father.123 The decision regarding publication or the posting
of notice requires a balancing of the interests of the mother and the
natural father.
The possibility of embarrassment for the mother may deter some
unwed mothers from placing their children for adoption even when an
adoption would be in the child's best interests.1 2 4 Although the inter-
ests of the father are significant, the low success ratio of notice by pub-
lication tips the scale in favor of the mother's interests. The
possibility of embarrassment to the mother, the deterrent effect on
the placement of her child, and the low probability of notification of
the father by publication demand a restriction on the discretion of the
judge. The provision could be refined to state that "the publication or
posting of notice should be permitted only when an inquiry conducted
by the court reveals that the probability of notification of the father
through publication is substantial."
VI. CONCLUSION
Sections 43-104.02 to 43-104.04 of the Nebraska statutes inade-
122. Two states that have adopted a shorter time period are Colorado and North Da-
kota. See CoLO. REV. STAT. § 19-6-126(4) (1986)(3 months); N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-
20-45(5) (Supp. 1987)(30 days).
123. UNIF. PARENTAGE AcT § 25(e), 9B U.L.A. 295, 340 (1973).
124. Id.
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quately protect the constitutional rights of putative fathers in the
State of Nebraska. This statutory scheme discriminates against un-
wed fathers, fails to protect putative fathers' opportunity interests,
and presumes that fathers who fail to file are unfit.
The aforementioned constitutional violations should ultimately
prompt statutory reform by the Nebraska Legislature. Before at-
tempting to draft the new statutes, however, the Legislature should
consider adopting sections 4, 24, and 25 of the Uniform Parentage Act.
Unlike the existing Nebraska statutes, these sections attempt to bal-
ance the interests of all the relevant parties, including those of the
putative father.
Daniel S. Wilson '89
